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Institutions and Conventions of Quality 
Christian Bessy ∗ 
Abstract: »Institutionen und Qualitätskonventionen«. Several contributions of 
the special issue “Conventions and institutions from a historical perspective” 
(HSR 36.4) show that the dynamics of institutions and conventions are differ-
ent and therefore the analysis of their interactions is of crucial issue, as we will 
to show in a first part. In a second part, we propose to analyse the use of the 
notion of “convention of quality” and in particular, the link between this no-
tion and the capabilities of experts, in a distributed cognition perspective. 
Keywords: conventions of quality, institutions, expertise, distributed cognition. 
 
Generally speaking, economics of convention (in short EC) recognises that 
beyond institutional codified rules which organise the “markets” there is a 
place for more informal or implicit rules that we can call “conventions”. They 
facilitate the coordination of economic agents under the conditions of uncer-
tainty and of incomplete rules, in particular by stabilizing commune designa-
tion or qualification of product (people or other entities), legal and statistical 
categories. As several contributions of the special issue HSR 36 (4) show, this 
notion of ‘convention’ is narrowly connected with that of language and inter-
pretative issues.  
The question of interpretation is at the heart of the contribution of Alain 
Desrosières (2011) in which he remarkably shows the critical posture of the 
founding fathers of EC concerning quantification (although they have been 
trained to statistical tools at a very high level). For them, it is important to take 
into account the fact that statistical categories are based on conventions of 
equivalence which are always criticized and change over time. It constitutes a 
serious obstacle to the constructions of long time series by historians and econ-
omists using cliometrics. A good example is given by the contribution of Lau-
rent Thévenot (2011) on the transformation of statistical surveys on profession-
al and social mobility. He shows the incommensurability between surveys, 
since underlying principles and public action orientations had strongly changed 
over the period 1960-2000. 
Several contributions also show that the dynamics of institutions and con-
ventions are different and therefore the analysis of their interactions is of cru-
cial issue, as we will to show in a first part. In a second part, we propose to 
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analyse the use of the notion of “convention of quality” (Eymard-Duvernay et 
al. 2006) and in particular, the link between this notion and the capabilities of 
experts, in a distributed cognition perspective. 
1.  The Dynamics of Conventions and Institutions 
We join the editors of this special issue for considering institutions, like legal 
rules, as a way to rule conflicts, to arbitrate between different rules or claims, 
to supply a normative reference that can change in time. The construction of 
this normative reference implicates a deliberative activity taking into account 
different criteria of justice, including economic efficiency (for our concern), 
and the evolution of the environment (Salais 1998). 
1.1  The Institutionalisation Process 
A main idea advanced by EC is that the emergence of institutional codified 
rules is preceded by a more or less preparatory period of debates, affairs or 
scandals. These debates lie on the anterior constitution of different kinds of 
associations, collective bodies elaborating critical arguments, political claims, 
cognitive artefacts like statistics, categories, and definitions of products or 
technological process. All of this cognitive and political work at the macro 
level relies on the research of cooperative solutions designed, at the micro 
level, by economic actors themselves for resolving their coordination problems, 
beyond their conflicts of interests. When conflicts remain, it can lead to the 
state’s intervention.  
As a result, the institutionalisation process, its normative power, not only 
depends on the sole political energy (the will of a government) or the promo-
tion of a good balance between different concerns, but also on this decentral-
ised (micro) research of cooperative solutions, the cognitive work and the polit-
ical construction of interests combined. We can therefore think of 
institutionalisation and in particular of the regulative power of law as an inter-
active process between legal texts and cooperative solutions elaborated by the 
micro actors themselves, a process in which different kinds of “intermediaries” 
play an important role (Bessy et al. 2011). 
Thus, it is accurate to show how ‘local’ or ‘micro’ actors redefine general 
rules. A good example is given by the contribution of Claire Judde de Larivière 
and Georges Hanne (2011) in which they show how occupational groups re-
worked nomenclatures (of profession) by incorporating elements of endoge-
nous classification, inspired by their knowledge of the various technical aspects 
of their occupations. This process leads to constant negotiations (boundaries 
struggles) whose purpose was to characterize the social status and prestige 
related to occupations.  
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Nevertheless institutional rules have the power of constraining economic 
agent’s behaviours: without this power of constraint, we could not understand 
why collective actors want to orientate the legislative process towards their 
proper advantage and why micro actors try to take over the law by cheating or 
more generally, by playing with the rules. 
Philippe Minard’s (2011) contribution gives of good illustration of the stra-
tegic use of the law. The collective advantage of maintaining standards could 
be strangely mixed with the individual hope of receiving the dividends from 
fraud. Besides, he shows the different uses of the regulation and their comple-
mentarities. Codified standards could be weapons for the most powerful: the 
traders. They could use standards to constrain suppliers in order to get pieces at 
the best possible prices, even when these standards were no longer applied.  
These arguments help to explain bizarre differences of opinion on regulation 
and its abolition. According to Minard, this instrumental vision of certification 
norms and procedures does not yet take into account the representations of 
quality that actors mobilize. The notion of ‘quality’ remains a fundamental 
constitutive element of trade pride (vocational pride): good work attracts oth-
er’s respect and fosters self-esteem.  
1.2  The Change of Convention 
The contribution of Bert De Munck (2011) has the merit to question EC on the 
dynamic of conventions in the long run (the history of conventions), from the 
study of guild’s regulations related to product quality. The author identifies a 
specific convention based on “intrinsic value”, i.e., value related to raw materi-
als used in the composition of the product. This composition is warranted by 
the seal of guilds (hall marks) whose members play a political role in the gov-
ernment of the cities. 
This type of convention would complete the approach from Boltanski and 
Thévenot by introducing epistemological considerations.1 According to De 
Munck, these considerations constitute a factor of change of conventions, in 
reference to the post-structuralism perspective developed par Foucault, Callon 
and Latour: 
While intrinsic value as a convention was connected to the idea of matter pos-
sessing mysterious, religious and creative power in itself, natural philosophers 
naturalized matter from the seventeenth century on. As a result; value may ha-
                                                             
1  In their model of justification, Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (2006) advance the main 
idea that coordination and evaluation involve “justification”, that is to say what is good and 
just in a certain “world” (‘cité’ in French). In this perspective, the notion of “convention” re-
fers to the definition (shared representation) of the common good, being given a plurality 
of fair principles allowing judging (and ranking) people and things. It leads to consider more 
explicitly both the cognitive and deontic (if not political) aspects of conventions, although 
certain conventions have the pure practical aspect of reducing the costs of coordination. 
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ve become synonymous with either the product’s place in a taxonomy of pro-
ducts or the meaning produced in discourses external to the product (De 
Munck 2011, 103). 
In Latour’s terms, “this may be seen as a ‘purification process’, in which ob-
jects or nature lost all “agency” while subjects (scientists) constructed the myth 
of humans being autonomous actors detached from objects” (De Munck 2011, 
115). 
This perspective is very stimulating for the EC approach and its underlying 
theory of value which is based upon social construction processes. EC address-
es critics to economics theories which consider value as a substance (utility, 
labor, and scarcity) embodied in commodities, a value exterior to any trades. 
The emphasis on social construction process and collective beliefs is particular-
ly relevant to explain the institution of currency.2  
Nevertheless Michel Foucault in Les mots et les choses (1966) gives a good 
account of the tensions between “monnaie-signe” and “monnaie-marchandise” 
which refers to two different episteme. In one case, the (monetary) sign refers 
to a space of representation, computation and exchanges (“la monnaie n’est 
qu’une richesse du signe dont le crédit est fondé sur la marque du prince”, 
Foucault 1966, 195). In the other case, the currency connects precious materials 
and representations (“Les signes de l’échange, écrit Foucault, parce qu’ils 
satisfont le désir, s’appuient sur le scintillement noir, dangereux et maudit du 
metal” Foucault 1966, 184). By referring solely to the economics of sign, with-
out any reference to the material support of the currency, we forget an ultimate 
gage of authenticity (trust) that exchanges need. 
The convention of ‘intrinsic value” advanced par de Munck is therefore rel-
evant, but leads to certain paradoxes. Is the notion of convention still relevant 
for apprehending this mode of valorization of products? As De Munck suggests 
himself, “the choice for intrinsic value was not an arbitrary one” (De Munck 
2011, 110). More than artisan skills (belonging to the guild), it was the best 
way to ground trustworthiness, also connected to the status of the masters in the 
city (which represent the common good). So, without any reference to arbitrary 
choice, we can simply speak about a “common or a shared practice” which is 
progressively imposed according to an evolutionary process.  
On the other side, is it relevant to talk about “intrinsic value”, knowing that 
the quality of raw material can itself be discussed and consequently present a 
conventional aspect? It seems to us that this kind of valuation is not akin with 
the categories of judgment because it is perceptual capacities that are first en-
gaged and affected by raw materials. Association mechanisms, described by 
                                                             
2  From this point of view, an author like André Orléan (2011) addresses a radical critic to 
these economic theories because value can be searched for itself as a universal purchasing 
power, because of the role played by the currency. It is the institution that grounds the val-
ue and the exchanges. The author makes a parallel between religious and monetary beliefs. 
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Foucault (the French notion of ‘similitudes’), connect the value of the object 
and the value of the subject (the spiritual presence of the master in the matter). 
This raises the question of authenticity.  
The new mode of valuation of product can be interpreted as a shift from a 
Renaissance to Classical episteme in which “truth became something man-
made”. The same process is at work with the foundation of the law. The intro-
duction of these epistemological considerations allows us to question conven-
tions: how they were produced, but also and more fundamentally, the very 
notion of convention and its close similarity to the one of institution and the 
importance of deliberative activity in their emergence. 
However, it seems to us that De Munck is too quick with the treatment of 
the model of justification of Boltanski and Thévenot and its capacity to account 
of different “conventions of quality”, as it is proposed by the contribution of 
Christof Jeggle (2011) on “Pre-industrial Worlds of Production”. 
2.  Conventions of Quality and Experts’ Capabilities  
For Jeggle (and in a certain way also for Minard), extended markets raise the 
issue on the product‘s legal definition and the actors struggle for the recogni-
tion of their own definition. They try to impose the standard that advantages 
them, by passing alliances with others actors, including political actors, in order 
to eliminate (or scream) cheaper competitors. 
2.1  The Instruments (Devices) of the Quality 
Signalling that standard is largely conventional as it allows a lot of actors to be 
coordinated. The stake is to stabilize a qualification that makes consensus, a 
convention, in order to reduce coordination costs. In this perspective, as De 
Munck’s contribution shows, it is only the composition of the product that 
matters. Within this standard product market, price competition rules the ex-
changes and the conditions of entry. Far to be a natural process, the authors 
notice that this kind of market relies on the social definition of the products and 
of their exchange modalities. In this configuration, the differentiation of the 
products passes by their filing, according to their conformity or not to the 
standard (qualified, half-qualified and dis-qualified products).  
The reference to a ‘world of serial production’ advanced by Jeggle is prob-
lematic. Nothing is said about the existence of optimization of transports flows 
and packaging. More generally, the author ought to pay more attention to the 
different devices mobilized by the actors. In this perspective, the economy of 
quality analysed by Minard leads him to set focus on different devices (‘dispos-
itifs’) of quality judgement by which products are qualified and economic 
agents delegate a part of their assessment power: networks of personal relation-
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ships, and more impersonal devices: appellations, labels, and trade-marks, fair 
of market, classification, gazette (about new fashion trends), and advertising 
campaign. The analysis of Jeggle (2011) could also more differentiate active 
and passive consumers, autonomous and heteronomous ones. Indeed, the liber-
al critic makes reference to the capacity of the buyers themselves to assess the 
qualities of the products. 
2.2  Expert Capabilities and Distributed Cognition 
Another interesting point of Minard’s contribution (on London leather market) 
is the analysis of the competences of the experts during the skins inspection 
and the role played by joint management under the Flaying act (Minard 2011). 
No specific text defined the criteria to distinguish between proper and improper 
flaying. The quality of skins could only be assessed by the subjective judgment 
of the inspectors.  
In this context, we think that their judgments are neither objective, nor sub-
jective; experts share commune perceptions which permit to pass from the 
material properties of things to qualifications of the products, from sensations 
to judgments, from corporal tests to representations. Without these commune 
perceptions, the risk is that the judgment is the result of pure crossed expecta-
tions, as in a pure coordination game. It is what Minard may want to mean by 
“pure convention”. This raises the issue both of the material embeddedness 
(anchorage) of quality conventions and of the constraints weighing on the 
learning process.3 
Cognition is not a pure mental process but is distributed in the socio-
material environment.4 In this perspective, we do not agree with the criticism 
addressed by Rainer Diaz-Bone and Robert Salais to Douglas North (Diaz-
Bone and Salais 2011). Starting with distributed cognition North clearly shows 
the limits of the economic approach in which rationality is defined inde-
pendently of social context (Knight and North 1997). He therefore explores 
other approaches which adopt a more complex point of view on cognition, 
rationality and social context. Decisions are then the product of representations 
which are incorporated in institutions and in other cultural symbols. 
                                                             
3  Nevertheless, the author is right when is pointed out that this kind of agreement or shared 
judgement, unlike agreement which refer to written rules, is more flexible and allow the 
experts to take into account the market conditions and more generally the changes of envi-
ronment. But that introduces an uncertainty on the result of expertise. 
4  In this perspective, the works on distributed cognition (Hutchins 1995) are very exciting in 
order to understand the links between competences mobilised at work and technological 
and organisational knowledge incorporated in equipment, tools, cognitive artefacts, includ-
ing gathering devices and indigene languages, and organisational rules. 
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That leads us to a more endogenous concept of institutions within the new 
historical institutionalism susceptible to build a bridge with the situated prag-
matism adopted by EC (Bessy 2002).  
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